This article gives an overview of empathy in Affect Engineering and is the fifth article in a series designed for the layperson that explains the basics of Affect Engineering as a theory of emotions. Each article will begin with a list of questions that it will aim to address. The sections that follow will be in two parts each. The first part will be a short statement that answers each question as succinctly as possible. The second part will either be an explanation that goes into more detail where needed or explain some of the implications of the short answer.
QUESTIONS
How is empathy represented in Affect Engineering?
Can the regulation or intensity of empathy in the individual be modeled in Affect Engineering?
Can empathy, if it is extended towards other sentient lifeforms, inanimate objects, or intangible entities, be modeled in Affect Engineering?
How is empathy represented in Affect Engineering?
SHORT ANSWER
Empathy is mathematically modeled in Affect Engineering using imaginary numbers, that is to say, √(-1) or “i”. The variable used to signify whether or not empathy is involved is “Self-Distinction.” Vicarious valuations and emotions are mapped on a complex plane, with the real values marking the elapsed time.
IN DEPTH EXPLANATION
Empathy in Affect Engineering is generally understood as a person’s capacity to imagine the self as an other (i.e., non-self) experiencing a feeling. Individuals imagine themselves experiencing how an other would value an entity for a purpose and what they would feel with respect to the entity in a given scenario; this is modeled in a fashion similar to the emotions of the self (Category I emotions in Affect Engineering) and empathy’s presence is signaled by the variable of “Self-Distinction.” Self-Distinction answers the question, “Is the entity being valued for a purpose held by the self, or is the individual imagining the self as an other valuing the object for a purpose held by the other?”
Self-Distinction, in Affect Engineering, is a distinct variable (i.e., having a limit to what its inputs may be) and may only equal either +1 or -1. If the valuation for an object/entity concerns a purpose held by the individual (no empathy involved), then Self-Distinction equals +1. Alternatively, if the valuation for an object/entity concerns a purpose held by an other (empathy involved), then Self-Distinction equals -1. In the functions of Affect Engineering, Self-Distinction is taken to the one-half power (i.e., square root) and is positioned alongside the base of the functions. If no empathy is involved, the output becomes √(+1) or simply one, and a Cartesian plane is used. If empathy is involved, the output becomes ✓(-1) or “i” and an Argand plane (i.e., complex plane) is used to map the valuations for the imaginary numbers, which would then correspond to a vicarious valuation (i.e., the self imagining itself as an other).
Even though individuals are imagining themselves as an other valuing the entity, the 1:1:1:1 ratio (i.e., one entity may be given one value by one person for the fulfillment of one purpose) is still upheld as a principle, but it becomes a 2:2:2:2 ratio where the self’s own valuations respond to or combine and interact with what they imagine the other to be experiencing. This occurs in Category II Emotions (Interpersonal Emotions), Category III Emotions (Compound Interactive Emotions), and some Category IV Emotions (Emotive States).
Although the neurological model above may look overwhelming, it is perhaps easiest to look at one part of it at a time and keep in mind that the relationships are primarily associative; that is to say, things that happen together or in a chain are considered to be linked. When empathy is involved, the box “Other” [located in the middle near the top] in the chart is used, and indicates that the variable of Self-Distinction is -1. The above neurological model is based upon a function for a Category III Emotion in Affect Engineering (Compound Interactive) where the individual is attempting to influence the outcome of the other’s situation. It is also of the protective type for Category III emotions, as the self is attempting to avoid pain and Anxiety is being used to measure value. The counterpart to this would be an indulgent type, where the individual is attempting to pursue pleasure with Negative Anxiety being used.
Excitatory and inhibitory synapses are also incorporated just as in the model for the emotions of the self. Similarly, cognitive appraisal based approaches (starting with the cognitive processes that influence affect and feeling) would begin at top of the chart with signals and neural activity flowing in a predominantly downward direction. Alternatively, more physiological based approaches (starting with the affect and feeling itself) would start at the bottom of the chart with signals and neural activity generally flowing upwards to associate the feeling to something cognitively meaningful.
As the relationships are associative, these groups of neurons are modeled to be firing together and/or in sequence to one another to signify that they are related to one another. For instance, neurons firing to signal a particular entity might be marked with value for a purpose depending on how much Anxiety is being invested into them (i.e., valuing neurons firing at the same time, along with a cluster of neurons corresponding to the purpose they are being valued for). For scenarios concerning empathy, that is, where the individual imagines the self as an other, mirror neurons that fire both when the valuation concerns the self and someone or something the self is observing are one possible means by which an individual’s value system might be organized; alternatively, the individual might possess a separate group of neurons specifically tasked for vicariously valuing an other’s response. Either one of these possibilities could be modeled. In the above neurological model, the individual is acting to influence the outcome of the observed party (i.e., the other), and the two purposes are linked to one another; the perceived success or failure of the other has an influence on a purpose held by the self.
Can the regulation or intensity of empathy in the individual be modeled in Affect Engineering?
SHORT ANSWER
Yes, the regulation and intensity of empathy can be modeled with coefficients and modifiers to those coefficients to signify the self’s identification level with an other.
IN DEPTH EXPLANATION
The different degrees to which an individual may or may not empathize with an other is modeled with coefficients alongside the functions in Affect Engineering. It is well documented throughout history that people, for one reason or another, identify with certain groups of people or animals more easily than others. For groups that people do not identify with, they might even ignore them altogether, treating them as if they did not even exist. These coefficients are just outside of the Self-Distinction variable and represent the identification level of the self to an other target when empathy is involved. A larger coefficient (e.g., one) indicates that the self strongly identifies with the other individual and vicariously values the entity to the same degree that they would if they themselves were in the other’s position.
Identification levels can be illustrated with hypothetical sentient blobs of color and subtractive color mixing; this is a parallel for identifying with others based on socially constructed concepts such as race.
In the above identification chart, green blobs would be expected to identify strongest with other green blobs, because they share the fact of their greenness together. A coefficient of one for the identification level implies that the self identifies with the other perfectly. The self’s identification level with the other green blob is 100% and does not influence the self’s capacity to empathize at all; this serves as a baseline. Hence, the identification level chart above for the colored blobs reveals that a green blob would identify with another green blob perfectly.
In contrast, a smaller coefficient, (e.g., one-half or 1/2) would model that the self vicariously values the entity for a purpose at one-half of the intensity that they imagine an other would experience it at. Subsequently, the intensity of the emotion felt will be reduced. Blue and yellow paint mixed together will yield green; from a green blob’s perspective, this would lead to an identification level of one-half for both the yellow and blue blobs. This might be valuable to the individual for distancing the self from the plight of others in the face of overwhelming tragedy, in order to mitigate vicariously felt trauma. It might even just stem from the fact that yellow and blue are different enough from green that this could lead a green blob to not having a strong personal connection to the target (i.e., the other). This might serve the aim of resource management, given that empathizing with everyone and everything would potentially exhaust one’s available emotional resources quickly. Alternatively, it might stem from bias against the unknown.
A green blob in this case, might be expected to identify with a blue or yellow blob at one-half the level they would if they were in their position themselves. What this means is that the green blob would internalize vicarious valuations at approximately one-half the level a blue or yellow blog perceives them. It would take the vicarious valuations of two blue blobs, two yellow blobs, or a blue and a yellow blob together to equal that of one green blob, if they were all experiencing the same trauma or plight.
In cases where the coefficient for identification is set to zero, the self has no vicarious valuation for what they imagine an other would experience it (i.e., reduced to zero). The self effectively does not identify with the other at all, which might arise in scenarios where the self deems it is necessary to distance itself from an other. It might also arise from refusing to acknowledge the other as being worthy of empathy. This might be done by the individual in cases where an other or group of others is dehumanized so that the self does not empathize with their suffering, such as in scenarios where the other has committed offenses that the self deems unforgivable (e.g., war crimes, or serial killers). The usefulness here might be for resource management of emotional energy, or for maintaining one’s worldviews concerning morality and adherence to a code of ethics. If the self empathizes with an other whose conduct persistently violates what the self considers acceptable behavior, then cognitive dissonance would be one of the expected results; choosing to not identify, and subsequently not empathize with the other, would be one way to resolve the cognitive dissonance, or prevent it from arising in the first place.
In the above illustration, the green blob has not identified at all with the red blob, its complementary and opposite color. No matter how many red blobs are present, because the coefficient for the green blob’s identification level with the red blobs is zero, the green blob will effectively dismiss any and all vicarious valuations that arise from observing a red blob. It bears mentioning that such a blanket generalization of the red blobs would likely be fraught with errors in most cases.
On the opposite end, if one wished to model a situation where the self over-empathizes (e.g., hyper-empathy) or vicariously experiences the valuations and corresponding emotions to a greater degree than they imagine the other would experience it, then this could be modeled with coefficients greater than one. For example, a coefficient of three where empathy is involved, or 3 x √(-1), would hold that the self vicariously values the entity at three times the intensity that they imagine the other to experience it. This identification level formation may be voluntary, involuntary, or a mix of both depending on what assumptions a scientific observer wishes to use in a setup of function in Affect Engineering. Notwithstanding, the corresponding intensity of the emotion felt would also be modeled to be greater in the above example. A person who is overly sensitive to the wants and needs of others may easily blow things out of proportion if they overestimate an other’s situation in this manner, and feel the emotion more strongly than they would if they were in that position themselves. This might happen, for instance, between a parent and a child.
Can empathy, if it is extended towards other sentient lifeforms, inanimate objects, or intangible entities, be modeled in Affect Engineering?
SHORT ANSWER
Yes, empathy, if extended towards other sentient lifeforms, towards inanimate objects, or towards intangible entities for which the individual imagines what the object would feel if it could feel, can be modeled in Affect Engineering.
IN DEPTH EXPLANATION
The extension of empathy is not limited to other human beings in Affect Engineering. It may be extended towards other creatures (e.g., animals, pets, plants, other wildlife), towards inanimate objects (e.g., rocks, personal possessions like a doll or stuffed animal, vehicles, etc), or towards intangible concepts (e.g., ideas, fictional characters in a story, vague labels for groups of people, nations, etc). In each of these cases there are important things to consider.
Empathy Extended Towards Other Lifeforms
This is perhaps the most easily recognizable and relatable form of empathy due to the individual being able to readily witness the responses, behaviors, and actions of an other (e.g., lifeform in this case) they are empathizing with. Its usefulness in these scenarios is also somewhat self-evident as it is often directly tied to survival, or at least it is easier to make this connection when other lifeforms are involved. For instance, if, while hiking in a wooded area, one encounters and startles a mountain lion, being able to empathize with, or at the very least, grasp a rudimentary understanding of the mountain lion’s state of heightened alarm, becomes potentially life saving knowledge. One’s chances of surviving the encounter unscathed would go up significantly by taking this into account and backing away slowly instead of continuing in a business as usual manner.
Empathy Extended Towards Inanimate Objects
Regarding inanimate objects such as stuff animals and dolls, the use of empathy can serve a number of functions. In childhood, it may serve the role of helping a child to develop their empathy skills through practice and imaginative play. A stuffed teddy bear for example, is not going to give any feedback at a tea party, so it compels the child to imagine and anticipate the needs, albeit imaginary, of the toy.
Imaginative play with a stuff teddy bear is essentially empathy practice, more so if the child at play holds up both ends of the conversation, such as by asking the stuffed animal or doll, “Would you like some more tea?” and then responds for the stuffed bear, “Yes, I would. Thank you.”
While the parallels for this to eventually empathizing with people are readily apparent, sometimes empathizing with an inanimate object simply serves the function of inspiring them to take better care of the inanimate object. Plenty of people have given nicknames to the cars they drive, private planes they fly, boats they pilot, or they have anthropomorphized other machines, vehicles, or material possessions they own. If they are an adult, one would presume that they have hopefully already learned to empathize with other people, and are not doing it to practice for future human interactions. In the case of these inanimate objects, anticipating the maintenance needs of large/heavy machinery is also important for keeping it functioning properly. Like stuffed animals, dolls, or action figures, these inanimate objects cannot say what they need, unless they have been electronically programmed that way, such as a car’s check engine light.
Empathy Extended Towards Intangible Concepts
Thirdly, regarding the use of empathy with intangible objects, empathy may also be employed for other uses, such as a means of self-comfort (e.g., in the case of a lonely child with an imaginary friend) and is not solely restricted to practice. Empathizing with intangible objects may also be used for entertainment value, such as in the case of reading a fictional horror and romance novels. It may also be used for projective purposes if one wishes to forecast what a loosely defined group of people or things might value, feel, or do, such as a culture, society, or country, if they do not have a clearly defined center.
Summary
In sum, for each of these cases, where the self empathizes with other lifeforms, inanimate entities, and intangible entities, empathy can be modeled in Affect Engineering with the variable of Self-Distinction. However, as the employment of empathy in these instances goes from the more concrete (e.g., fauna and flora that have motives that can be reasonably deduced from evidence) towards the increasingly abstract (e.g., stuffed animals, dolls, statues, and cars with motives that are frequently fabricated) it is important to keep in mind that empathy is oftentimes imaginative in its nature. This is both a blessing and a curse.
Preview
The organizing principles behind the four categories of emotions in Affect Engineering will be covered in the sixth article. Thereafter, each emotion’s core distinguishing features will be covered in the remaining six.
